Drug Trafficking Sentencing in Florida: Can Seven Pills Turn a Defendant into a First-Degree Felon by Perry, Heather A.
Nova Law Review
Volume 23, Issue 1 1998 Article 12
Drug Trafficking Sentencing in Florida: Can
Seven Pills Turn a Defendant into a
First-Degree Felon
Heather A. Perry∗
∗
Copyright c©1998 by the authors. Nova Law Review is produced by The Berkeley Electronic
Press (bepress). http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr
Drug Trafficking Sentencing in Florida: Can Seven Pills
Turn a Defendant into a First-Degree Felon?
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 525
II. BACKGROUND ............................................................................... 527
A. Hydrocodone Statutes ............................................................ 527
B. State v. Baxley ........................................................................ 528
C. State v. Holland ..................................................................... 529
D. Criticism of Both Decisions ................................................... 530
Il. HYDROCODONE STATUTES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ................. 531
A. Other States ........................................................................... 531
B. Federal Statute ....................................................................... 531
IV. DECISIONS INTERPRETING OTHER DRUG STATUTES .................... 532
A . Florida ................................................................................... 532
1. State v. Yu ......................................................................... 532
2. A fter Yu ............................................................................. 533
B . Federal ................................................................................... 537
1. Chapman v. United States ................................................. 537
2. Beyond Chapman .............................................................. 539
C. Applicability to Baxley and Holland ..................................... 542
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER SENTENCING ................................... 543
A. Finding a Middle Road .......................................................... 543
B. A Proposal by Thomas J. Meier ............................................ 544
VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 545
VII. ADDENDUM .................................................................................. 546
I. INTRODUCTION
Florida has been associated with illegal drugs since the television show
Miami Vice and the "Cocaine Cowboys" of the 1980's. Marijuana, cocaine,
heroin, crack, and LSD have fallen from the lips and pens of newscasters
and newspaper writers throughout the Sunshine State. However, Vicodint
1. Vicodin is "indicated for the relief of moderate to moderately severe pain."
PHYsicrAs DESK REFERENCE 1367-68 (Medical Economics Co. 52d ed. 1998). Its chemical
make-up is typically 7.5 milligrams of hydrocodone bitartrate combined with 750 milligrams
of acetaminophen. Id. Under the manufacturer's specifications, it is stated that the tablets are
classified as a SCHEDULE El substance. Id.
1
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may be the next drug to become a household name, not because of its
prolific use, but because of its impact on the Florida State drug laws. The
2technical name for Vicodin is hydrocodone, which is referred to in sections
893.03 (drug schedules) and 893.135(1)(c)(1) (trafficking) of the Florida
Statutes.3 Two Florida District Courts of Appeal have interpreted these
4
statutes in conflicting ways. When this happens, it creates a somewhat
chaotic situation due to the construction of the Florida court system.
5
In Florida, the trial courts, otherwise known as the circuit courts, are
bound by the decisions of the district court of appeal in that particular
district.6 However, if there is no case on point in that district, and there is a
case on point in another district, the trial court is bound by the other
district's decision.7 Nonetheless, decisions of the district court of appeal in
one district are merely persuasive authority in another district court of
appeal.8 Therefore, the other district courts of appeal are free to disagree.
When this happens, trial courts are not bound by either of the conflicting
districts, /unless the trial court happens to be located in one of the districts,
and then would, consequently, be bound by it anyway. 9 As such, until the
situation with these two district courts of appeal is resolved, trial courts in
Florida have no authority from which to seek guidance.1
0
This article will examine the discordant interpretations of the drug
statutes and attempt to reach a conclusion on which is the best reading. Part
II of this article will discuss the background of the statutes and the holdings
and rationale behind the two conflicting cases. Part III will discuss other
jurisdictions and their similar drug statutes. Part IV will discuss other
controlled substances and how they are regulated under the Florida Statutes.
Part V will suggest what should be done to resolve these inconsistencies.
Part VI will conclude this article.
2. See State v. Holland, 689 So. 2d 1268-69 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 893.03, .135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
4. See State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Holland, 689
So. 2d at 1268.
5. See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666-67 (Fla. 1992).
6. Id. at 666-67 (citing State v. Hayes, 333 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1976)).
7. Id. at 666.
8. Id. at 667 (citing State v. Hayes, 323 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1976)).
9. Id.
10. An exception, however, would be trial courts in the First and Fifth District Courts
of Appeal, since those courts are still bound to follow their particular district court.
[Vol. 23:523
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Hydrocodone Statutes
Section 893.135(1)(c)(1) of the Florida Statutes mandates that:
Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures,
delivers, or brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or
constructive possession of, 4 grams or more of any...
hydrocodone... or 4 grams or more of any mixture containing any
such substance, but less than 30 kilograms of such substance or
mixture, commits a felony of the first degree, which felony shall be
known as "trafficking in illegal drugs."
'1 I
Because hydrocodone is listed as a SCHEDULE H drug,12 it is
considered to have a "high potential for abuse."'13 However, pursuant to
section 893.03(3)(c)(4) of the Florida Statutes, if a tablet contains "not more
than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with recognized therapeutic amounts of
one or more active ingredients, which are not controlled substances," then
the substance is considered a SCHEDULE HI substance.' 4 This would make
the charge punishable as a third-degree felony,15 bringing a lighter sentence.
Reading these two statutes together, it may be possible to reach several
conclusions. The first may be that if a defendant is caught with four grams
of pills that contain hydrocodone, even if each pill contains less than fifteen
milligrams, punishment as a first-degree felony is proper. Perhaps this
should be labeled as the aggregation theory. This is the conclusion that
Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal reached in State v. Baxley.16
Another way to read the statutes is as the Florida First District Court of
11. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
12. Id. § 893.03(2)(a)(l)j).
13. Id. § 893.03(2). SCHEDULE I drugs are considered to have "a high potential for
abuse" and have "no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States and in
its use under medical supervision does not meet accepted safety standards." Id. § 893.03(1).
SCHEDULE II drugs have a "high potential for abuse and has a currently accepted but
severely restricted medical use in treatment in the United States." Id. § 893.03(2).
SCHEDULE III drugs have "a potential for abuse less than the substances contained in
Schedules I and II and has a currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States."
FLA. STAT. § 893.03(3) (1997).
14. Id. § 893.03(3)(c)(4).
15. Id. § 893.13(l)(a)(2).
16. 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Perry
3
Perry: Drug Trafficking Sentencing in Florida: Can Seven Pills Turn a De
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
Nova Law Review
Appeal did in State v. Holland,17 which will lead to the conclusion that if a
person is caught with pills that contain hydrocodone, but each pill contains
less than fifteen milligrams, punishment is only proper as a SCHEDULE III
substance, and thus as a third-degree felony. 8 This apparent ambiguity in
the statutes has created a conundrum in the legal world and, likewise, caused
a split in the appellate courts of the State of Florida.
B. State v. Baxley
"Michael Baxley was charged with [both] conspiracy to traffic and
trafficking in hydrocodone" under section 893.135(1)(c)(1) of the Florida
Statutes.' His charges were dismissed in the lower court and the State
appealed.20 The appellate court acknowledged several arguments made by
Baxley, the first of which was that if the tablets in question contain less than
fifteen milligrams, then they are considered a SCHEDULE Ill drug.2' The
court doused this argument, however, by stating that "only a small amount of
hydrocodone is a SCHEDULE I substance. 22 Instead, the court held that
it did not matter if the amount involved was four grams of pure hydrocodone
or four grams of a mixture of hydrocodone; either one would suffice to make
it a SCHEDULE II substance and therefore punishable as a first-degree
felony.a3
Baxley also argued that hydrocodone is listed in both SCHEDULE II
and SCHEDULE III, but both schedules provide an exemption if listed in
another schedule.24 The court, however, stated that this gave its reading of
the statute more credence because it proves that SCHEDULE I substances
are only those limited by section 893.03(3)(c)(4), 25 and all other
hydrocodone is considered a SCHEDULE II substance.26  In reaching this
17. 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
18. Id. at 1270; see also § 893.03(3)(c)(4) (1997).
19. Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis omitted).
23. Id.
24. Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832.
25. FLA. STAT. § 893.03(3)(c)(4) (1997). Section 893.03(3)(c)(4) of the Florida
Statutes states that "any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing limited
quantities of... [n]ot more than 300 milligrams of hydrocodone per 100 milliliters or not
more than 15 milligrams per dosage unit, with recognized therapeutic amounts of one or more
active ingredients which are not controlled substances" are SCHEDULE III substances. Id.
26. Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832.
[Vol. 23:523
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 12
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/12
1998]
conclusion, the court cited Lareau v. State,27 and Mack v. Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co.,28 both of which stand for the proposition that when two laws of
the same subject seem to be ambiguous, they should be read in pari
29. 30
materia in order to give effect to them both. In sum, the Baxley court
held that "[i]f the number of tablets aggregates [four] grams or more of
hydrocodone or a mixture of hydrocodone, then we agree with the State that
prosecution is proper under section 893.135. "31 The Supreme Court of
Florida denied review of the Baxley case.
32
C. State v. Holland
In 1997, the Florida First District Court of Appeal certified conflict
with the Baxley court in State v. Holland.33 Holland had been charged with
five counts of trafficking in hydrocodone.34 He subsequently filed a motion
to dismiss pursuant to an affidavit given by a pharmacist asserting that the
drug alleged in the information was in fact a SCHEDULE III drug as
opposed to a SCHEDULE II drug, and therefore did not fall within the
parameters of the trafficking statute.35  The lower court dismissed the
information, and the State appealed.36
The Holland court, in reading section 893.135(1)(c)(1) together with
section 893.03(3)(c)(4), held that "if a mixture containing the controlled
substance falls within the parameters set forth in [Schedule] III, the amount
of the controlled substance per dosage unit, not the aggregate amount or
weight, determines whether the defendant may be charged with violating
section 893.135(1)(c)1, of the Florida Statutes. 37 Therefore, in its case sub
judice, the court found that, since the Vicodin tablets that were allegedly
sold by Holland had less than fifteen milligrams per dosage unit of
27. 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991).
28. 673 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
29. In pari materia is defined as: "[u]pon the same matter or subject." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 791 (6th ed. 1990). Statutes "in pai materia" relate to the same person or thing
and have a common purpose. Id.
30. Baxley, 684 So. 2d at 832-33 (citing Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991);
Mack v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 673 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
31. Id.
32. Baxley v. State, 694 So. 2d 737 (Fla. 1997).
33. 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
34. Id. at 1269.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1270; see also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
Perry
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hydrocodone, his violation did not fall within the trafficking statute. 38 The
court went on to hold that regardless of the number of tablets sold, the
concentration of hydrocodone per dosage unit will remain below the
threshold of fifteen milligrams. In other words, even if the amount of
milligrams in each pill equals four grams when added together, if each pill
contained less than fifteen milligrams, the defendant would escape the
trafficking statute.
D. Criticism of Both Decisions
The largest problem with the Baxley decision is that it is extremely
harsh in its punishment. Consider this example: a defendant is illegally in
possession of ten Vicodin tablets. Each tablet contains 7.5 milligrams of
hydrocodone and 750 milligrams of acetaminophen, which is the typical
makeup.4°  Therefore, the defendant is in possession of a total of 7575
milligrams of Vicodin. After converting from milligrams to grams, it
brings the total to 6.575 grams of Vicodin.42 However the defendant is only
in possession of 0.075 grams of hydrocodone. 43 In order to be sentenced
under the trafficking statute,44 the defendant has to be in possession of four
grams of hydrocodone or a mixture containing hydrocodone. Therefore, if
the Baxley court were followed, the hypothetical defendant would be subject
to prosecution under the trafficking statute, and thus charged with a first-
degree felony. It is hard to fathom that the legislature intended for a person
to be sentenced for a first-degree felony for the possession of ten Vicodin
pills. In essence, it appears that the Baxley court would be over-inclusive in
its approach.
The Holland case is also not without fault. It appears from that
decision that aggregation of the weight or the amount of any SCHEDULE III
controlled substances under any circumstances is not permitted.4 5 Therefore,
if an individual illegally sold, delivered, possessed, or manufactured a large
38. Holland, 689 So. 2d at 1270.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 1.
41. Calculations are as follows: 750 + 7.5 = 757.5. Then 757.5 x 10 (pills) = 7575
milligrams.
42. There are 1000 milligrams in one gram.
43. This is because there is only 7.5 milligrams of hydrocodone in one Vicodin tablet.
See supra note 1. 7.5 x 10 = 75 milligrams. To convert to grams, divide by 1000, thus the
total grams are 0.075.
44. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(l)(c)(1) (1997).
45. Holland, 689 So. 2d at 1270.
[Vol. 23:523
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quantity of pills containing a SCHEDULE iI controlled substance, and the
pills contained less than the requisite fifteen milligrams, that person could
never be charged with trafficking. This follows even if the accused
possessed 1000 pills. This theory fails because, most likely, if a person has
that many pills in his or her possession, he or she would be attempting to
traffic them, and thus should be subject to the trafficking statute. Further,
there are no Vicodin pills that contain more than fifteen milligrams per
dosage unit. Therefore, the holding in the Holland case is weak because it is
under-inclusive. It would render meaningless the provision of SCHEDULE
II as it applies to hydrocodone.
I. HYDROCODONE STATUTES IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
A. Other States
Most states have drug trafficking statutes similar to Florida's. Some,
however, only list hydrocodone in SCHEDULE II, while some list
hydrocodone solely in SCHEDULE J]I.46 Notwithstanding, no other statehas decided a case on point with Holland or Baxley.
B. Federal Statute
Title 21, section 812 of the United States Code4 7 provides the schedules
48
of controlled substances. The construction of the hydrocodone statute in
the federal version is very similar to the Florida Statute, with two
exceptions. The first is an insignificant one, in that the United States Code
refers to hydrocodone as "dihydrocodeinone. ''49 The second, however, may
be considered quite consequential, and is found in the sentencing guidelines.
46. The states that list hydrocodone in both SCHEDULES like the Floida statute are:
Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-26, 27 (1996); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. § 329-18 (1993);
Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 124.206 (West 1997); Mississippi, MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-29-115,
117 (1972); Missouri, Mo. REv. STAT. § 195.017 (WEST 1996); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 50-32-224, 226 (1997); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 195.017 (1995); New York, N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAW § 3306 (McKinney 1998); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 1903.1-07,
09 (1997); Texas, TEX. HEALTH & SAFr'y CODE ANN. § 481.104 (West 1998); West Virginia,
W. VA. CODE § 60A-2-208 (1998); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 961.18 (1997).
47. 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1994).
48. Id.
49. See id. § 812(d)(3)-(4) SCHEDULE III. Dihydrocodeine and hydrocodone are
used interchangeably. Id. Some states even list them like this: "dihydrocodeine
(hydrocodone)." See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-29-117 (1997).
Perry
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Section 2Dl.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines sets forth the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines for federal drug trafficking offenses.5 In
order to obtain uniformity throughout the country, drug offenders are
sentenced according to a base offense level.5' The requisite amount for each
level is very specific, with a range of only ten to twenty grams, 52 as opposed
to Florida's degree-oriented felonies where the range may be four to 400
grams.53 The most important difference in these sentencing guidelines may
be "Note A" inserted by the legislature that reads: "[u]nless otherwise
specified, the weight of a controlled substance set forth in the table refers to
the entire weight of any mixture or substance containing a detectable amount
of the controlled substance. 54
IV. DECISIONS INTERPRETING OTHER DRUG STATUTES
A. Florida
1. State v. Yu
In State v. Yu, 55 the defendants attempted a constitutional attack on
56
section 893.135 of the Florida Statutes. The lower court held that using
the weight of 'any mixture containing cocaine"' instead of the weight of the
pure cocaine was "arbitrary, unreasonable, and a violation of due process
and equal protection of the law. ' 57 Relying on People v. Mayberry,58 an
Illinois case, and United States ex rel. Daneff v. Henderson,59 a federal case,
60the Supreme Court of Florida disagreed. In Daneff, the court noted that
dangerous drugs are typically marketed in a diluted or impure state.61 It also
stated that "[t]he State cannot be expected to make gradations and
differentiations and draw distinctions and degrees so fine as to treat all law
violators with the precision of a computer. ' 62 Relying on the Daneff case,
50. 18 U.S.C.A § 2Dl.1 (West Supp. 1998).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See id.; FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1997).
54. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2Dl.1 Notes to Drug Quantity Table (A).
55. 400 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1981).
56. Id. at 763.
57. Id. at 764.
58. 345 N.E.2d 97 (Ili. 1976).
59. 501 F.2d 1180 (2d Cir. 1974).
60. Yu, 400 So. 2d at 764.
61. Daneff, 501 F.2d at 1184.
62. Id.
8
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the Supreme Court of Florida opined that it was reasonable for the
legislature to conclude that a mixture containing cocaine could be disbursed
to a larger amount of people than the same amount .of pure cocaine and
therefore could create a greater likelihood for harm to the public.
63
The United States Supreme Court almost had an opportunity to decide
this question when one of the defendants from the Yu case appealed the
decision of the Supreme Court of Florida to this nation's highest court in
Wall v. State.64  This appeal, however, was denied for jurisdictional
reasons. Justice Brennan noted in the denial that he would have heard the
case on its merits and postponed the question of jurisdiction. 66  It is
unfortunate that he was not allowed to do so.
2. After Yu
Since the Yu case, other Florida courts have had to apply its principles.
In Asmer v. State,67 the defendant was convicted of trafficking in
methaqualone in an amount exceeding 200 grams. 68 At trial, the expert
witness for the State testified that she had weighed the tablets, and their total
weight was 795.7 grams, well above the requisite 200 grams.69 However,
she admitted that she had only tested one of the tablets at random for
methaqualone, and that particular tablet contained the drug.70 The defendant
appealed his conviction and argued that the State failed to prove that he sold
200 grams of methaqualone alone, since it only tested one tablet.71
The court found no merit in this argument.72 Instead, it referred to Yu,
remarking that the State is not "expected to draw distinctions so fine as to
treat all law violators with the precision of a computer."73 It went on to state
that it would be "patently unreasonable" to require the state to test each of
the 1000 tablets to prove that there were enough tablets that contained pure
63. Yu, 400 So. 2d at 765 (citing United States ex rel. Daneff v. Henderson, 501 F.2d
1180, 1184 (2d Cir. 1974)).
64. 454 U.S. 1134 (1981).
65. Id. at 1134.
66. Id.
67. 416 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
68. Id. at 486.
69. Id. at 486-87.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 487.
72. Asmer, 416 So. 2d at 487.
73. Id. (citing State v. Yu, 400 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1981)).
1998]
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methaqualone to satisfy the statute.74 Therefore, the court upheld Asmer's
conviction on the testing of one tablet."
76In Ross v. State, the court distinguished the holding in the Asmer case
as it did not apply to the random testing of only one of several separately
wrapped packages of cocaine. 77  The defendant in Ross was caught with a
brown paper bag that contained two bundles. 78 The first bundle had thirty-
six separately wrapped plastic bags of white powder.79 The second bundle
had fifty-six separately wrapped plastic packets of white powder.8" The
laboratory technician in the Dade County Crime Laboratory tested one of the
plastic bags from each of the bundles, and found that they both contained
cocaine.81 The technician then emptied the contents of the baggies in the
first bundle into one envelope and then emptied the contents of the second
bundle into another envelope.82 The envelope with the first bundle weighed
8312.6 grams, and the envelope with the second bundle weighed 26.2 grams,
totaling 38.8 grams.84 The defendant was then charged with trafficking in
cocaine under section 893.135(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.85
The court found this testing to be inadequate.86 It held that simply
visually examining the separately wrapped packets was not sufficient.
87
Instead, the court suggested that each packet (baggie) of the white powder
should have been chemically tested by random sample.88 Furthermore, the
court opined that there are a vast number of white substances that could
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 528 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
77. Id. at 1240.
78. Id. at 1238.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1238.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(b) (1997). Section 893.135 (1)(b) of the
Florida Statutes states:
Any person who knowingly sells, purchases, manufactures, delivers, or
brings into this state, or who is knowingly in actual or constructive
possession of, 28 grams or more of cocaine, as described in s.
893.03(2)(a)(4),or any mixture containing cocaine ... commits a felony of
the first degree, which felony shall be known as "trafficking in cocaine."
Id.
86. Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1239.
87. Id.
88. Id.
[Vol. 23:523
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89easily appear to be cocaine due to their white powdery appearance. s
Therefore, although one of the packets contained cocaine, the others could
very well be just a white powdery substance that looks like cocaine. 90
The court noted that random testing of separate bags containing similar
looking materials is distinguishable from the random testing of pills, which
was the case in Asmer.9' This is because the random sample of pills is taken
from a single packet or bag, and thus the substance is commingled with the
similar looking material. 92 From that, the court opines, one can infer that the
substances are the same.93 The court states, however, that one cannot make
that inference where the "untested material is not commingled with the
random sample."94 Therefore, since the bags in the Ross case were not
commingled, the supposition could not be made, and the defendant's charge
was reduced to simple possession.95
Chief Judge Schwartz dissented in the opinion.9 He disagreed with the
majority because he found that it was reasonable to conclude that the
material in the packet was representative of the other packages.97  He
thought that the fact that there were separate envelopes was simply a
difference, rather than a distinction between Asmer and Ross.98 The Chief
Judge found that: "a reasonable person could conclude beyond a reasonable
doubt that all of the packages in the two bundles contained cocaine." 99 He
observed that since the defendant possessed both bundles at the same time,
they were properly added together.' °
In State v. Clark,'0 ' the Florida Third District Court of Appeal upheld
its decision in the Ross case.1°2 In Clark, the State's chemist had randomly
tested capsules of cocaine contained in separate packages in one defendant's
case, and in a single bag in another defendant's case.'03 The capsules that
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1239-40.
91. Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1240 (citing Asmer v. State, 416 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Ross, 528 So. 2d at 1241 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 538 So. 2d 500 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
102. Id. at 501.
103. Id.
1998]
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were tested did contain heroin, but it was less than the statutory
requirement.1°4 The chemist then mixed the contents of the capsules that
were taken from each package before they were weighed, and concluded that
the mixture contained enough heroin to violate section 893.135(1)(c) of the
Florida Statutes. 105
The court held that capsules that contained a white powdery substance
are not distinguishable from the plastic packets (baggies) in the Ross case. 1°6
Since Ross requires the testing of samples from each packet, it similarly
requires the testing of the capsules.1c 7 The Ross decision also dictates that
the randomly tested material must add up to at least four grams. °' The court
went on to hold that the chemist in this case did not follow these methods,
and therefore the defendant's charges should be reduced from trafficking to
possession.
10 9
Chief Judge Schwartz, again, did not agree entirely with the majority,
and filed a concurring opinion."10 He stated, again, that he disagreed with
the decision in the Ross case, but since its holding represented the law and it
applied to the case at hand, he was bound to follow it."' He agreed with the
State that the capsules in this case were more analogous to the packets in
Ross than the pills in Asmer.12 However, he stated that "both the untested
capsules and the untested pills in Asmer may just as easily contain harmless
substances-the other capsules may be Contac; the other pills may be
aspirin-as the untested powdery substance in Ross may be flour or
sugar."'"13 "Since the possibility that the untested materials are innocent is
the very foundation of Ross," the judge reluctantly agreed that the decision
of the majority was the correct one." 4 In short, he says, "since we are stuck
with Ross, we are stuck with ruling with the appellees [defendants] in this
case as well."
115
104. Id.
105. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1) (1997). Section 893.135(1) of the Florida
Statutes is the same statute under which Holland and Baxley were convicted. Id.
106. Clark, 538 So. 2d at 502 (Schwartz, C.J., concurring).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at500.
111. Clark, 538 So. 2d at 501 (Schwartz, C.J., concurring).
112. Id. (citing Ross v. United States, 528 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
Asmer v. State, 416 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
113. Clark, 538 So. 2d at 501-02 (Schwartz, J., concurring).
114. Id. at 502.
115. Id.
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B. Federal
1. Chapman v. United States
In 1991, the United States Supreme Court came down with a landmark
decision in Chapman v. United States."' In delivering the majority opinion
of the Court, Justice Rehnquist held that "Note A' 117 required blotter paper
to be counted for sentencing purposes in the total weight of lysergic acid
diethylmide ("LSD").'"8  In that case, the defendants were convicted of
selling ten sheets of blotter paper, which contained 1000 doses of LSD." 9
The pure weight of the LSD itself was only fifty milligrams; however,
combined with the blotter paper, the total weight came to 5.7 grams.' 20
Since 42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v) mandates a minimum sentence of five
years for distributing more than one gram of LSD, the defendants were
imposed with this sentence.12  This aggregate weight "was also used to
determine the base offense level under the United States Sentencing
Commission Guidelines Manual.
122
The defendants argued that the blotter paper should not be used to
determine the total weight of the LSD because it is only a carrier medium
and should not be included when calculating a sentence for LSD
distribution.123 They reasoned that construing 42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v)
in such a manner would lead to aberrant results, and disparity in the
sentencing practices.'24
In order to combat this argument, the Court relied on two things: the
construction of the statute and its legislative history.1' 5 First, the Court
116. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
117. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2Dl.1 (West Supp. 1998). Notes to Drug Quantity Table (A).
118. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 468.
119. Id. at 455.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 455-56. See also 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v).
122. Id. at 456.
123. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 458.
124. Id. The court summarized petitioners' argument as follows:
a major wholesaler caught with 19,999 doses of pure LSD would not be
subject to the 5-year mandatory minimum sentence, while a minor pusher
with 200 doses on blotter paper, or even one dose on a sugar cube, would be
subject to the mandatory minimum sentence. Thus, they contend, the weight
of the carrier should be excluded, the weight of the pure LSD should be
determined, and that weight should be used to set the appropriate sentence.
125. Id. at 453-55.
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pointed out that the statute provides for different sentences for an offender
caught with a "mixture or substance containing a detectable amount" of the
drugs and one who is caught with a pure amount of the drug.2 6 The Court
exemplified this by referring to the phencyclidine ("PCP") statute found in
42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v)."' The Court's thought process is founded in
the belief that the legislature could have provided for different sentences for
the pure amounts of all the drugs if it so desired. 28 The fact that it did not
do this means that the legislature intended for carrier mediums to be
included in calculating the weight.
29
The Court next looked to the legislative history of the statute to provide
insight into the situation. 13 The Court stated that "[t]he current penalties for
LSD distribution originated in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.,'3' In the
Act, "Congress adopted a 'market-oriented' approach to punishing drug
trafficking." 32 This means that the total quantity of what is distributed is
the means for calculating the length of a sentence, not the amount of the pure
drug involved. 33 The Court deemed from the legislative history that the
purpose behind this was to keep from punishing the retail traffickers less
severely, even though they deal in lesser quantities of the pure drug, because
they are the people that "keep the street markets going."' 34 This would
explain why a wholesaler caught with 19,999 doses of LSD might be
punished less severely than a street trafficker caught with only 200 doses. 35
The defendants made one last argument. They asserted that the terms
"mixture" or "substance" cannot be given their dictionary meaning, as the
Court implied, because then the statute could be interpreted to embody
carriers such as a glass vial or a car in which the drugs are being transported,
which would make the statute senseless. 36 The Court, however, defrayed
this argument as well. 37 It contended that blotter paper qualified because,
when combined with LSD, "the particles of one are diffused among the
126. Id. at 459.
127. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 459.
128. See id.
129. Id. at 459.
130. Id. at 460.
131. Id. at 461.
132. Chapman, 500 U. S. at 461.
133. Id. at461.
134. Id.
135. See id. at 458.
136. Id. at462.
137. Chapman, 500 U.S. at 462-63.
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14
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 12
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/12
Perry
particles of the other." 138 Therefore, the "term does not include LSD in a
bottle, or LSD in a car, because the drug is easily distinguished from, and
separated from, such a 'container.
'
'
1 39
2. Beyond Chapman
Lower federal courts have had trouble applying the Chapman
guidelines to other drug situations.14° In United States v. Mahecha-
Onofre, 14 the defendant chemically bonded cocaine to several suitcases in
an attempt to elude customs officials. 142 The district court sentenced
Mahecha-Onofre to a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence under 42
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v).1 43 The court based its calculations for sentencing
purposes on the weight of the cocaine and the suitcase material, as opposed
to the pure weight of the cocaine.144 The court rejected the idea that if the
material with which a substance is mixed can not be ingested with the
controlled substance, then it cannot be added to the weight for sentencing
purposes.' 45 Instead, the Court found that the suitcase material should be
included in the total weight for sentencing purposes. 146
The Eleventh Circuit decided to go another way.147 In United States v.
Rolande-Gabrel,14 8 the court held that the term "mixture," for the purposes
of the Sentencing Guidelines, "does not include unusable mixtures."1 49 The
defendant in this case was intercepted at Miami International Airport and
found with sixteen plastic bags filled with a liquid substance containing
138. Id. at 462 (citing 9 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICrIONARY 921 (2d ed. 1989)).
139. Id. at 462-63.
140. Thomas J. Meier, A Proposal to Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture or
Substance" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377,
395 (1993). For a more detailed discussion of United States v. Chapman and the progression
of the interpretations of Section 841 of the United States Code, see Thomas J. Meier, A
Proposal to Resolve the Interpretation of "Mixture or Substance" Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 377 (1993).
141. 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1991).
142. Id. at 624.
143. Id. at 625.
144. Id. The weight of the cocaine combined with the weight of the suitcase totaled 12
kilograms, while the pure cocaine weighed only 2.5 kilograms. Id.
145. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d at 626.
146. Id.
147. United States v. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 1231.
149. Id. at 1238.
19981
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cocaine. Based on scientific evidence, the court stated that the cocaine
found in Rolande-Gabriel's bags was not in a usable form, since it would
have had to be extracted from the liquid to be sold on the streets, and the
cocaine could not be ingested or consumed in that form.151 The court argued
that the cocaine in the mixture was "easily distinguished from, and separated
from" tne liquid.) 2 Therefore, the court held that it would be irrational to
include the liquid in the total weight for sentencing purposes.1
5 3
The Sixth Circuit took yet another approach in United States v.
Jennings. 54 The defendants in that case were interrupted in the process of
"cooking" methamphetamine, and argued that if they had not been disturbed,
the weight of the drug would have been much less.' 55 The court agreed with
the Chapman interpretation that "Congress did not want to punish retail
traffickers of drugs less severely," even when dealing with smaller amounts
of the pure drugs, because they are the people who "keep the street markets
going." 56 However, following that line of thinking, the court held that "the
defendants [in this case] were not attempting to increase the amount of
methamphetamine they had available to sell by adding a dilutant, cutting
agent, or carrier medium, but rather were attempting to distill
methamphetamine from the otherwise uningestible byproducts of its
manufacture."'157 Therefore, the court held that the total weight was not to be
used. 5
Another case that is more comparable to the hydrocodone situation is
United States v. Young. 59 The defendant in the case, John Ed Young, Sr.,
was convicted of possession of Dilaudid' 6° with intent to distribute, in
150. Id. at 1232.
151. Id. at 1237.
152. Rolande-Gabriel, 938 F.2d at 1237 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
453 (1991)).
153. Id. at 1237.
154. 945 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1991), opinion clarified by 966 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 1992).
155. Id. at 134. Testimony at the trial revealed that the total amount in the mixture was
4180 grams but contained only 1.67% methamphetamine. Id. The government's chemist
testified that if the chemicals had been able to react entirely, the solution would have yielded
over 100 grams of methamphetamine. Id.
156. Id. at 136 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453 (1991)).
157. Jennings, 945 F.2d at 137.
158. Id.
159. 992 F.2d 207 (8th Cir. 1993).
160. Dilaudid is a painkiller similar to morphine. DRUGS IN LmGATION 394, 394
(Richard M. Patterson, J.D. ed., Law Publishers, 1996 ed.) (1996). Its active ingredient is
called hydromorphone, which is a Schedule II substance under the federal statute. Id. at 208
n.2. Also note that hydromorphone and hydrocodone are listed together in all the same
[Vol. 23:523
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violation of 42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(v).' 61 On appeal, he argued that the
district court erred by sentencing him based on the entire weight of the
Dilaudid tablets, instead of the hydromorphone alone. 62 Young argued that
the Chapman case is distinguishable here because it involved 42 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(B), 163 which states that the offense is distributing a mixture of the
substance, while he was convicted under 42 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), 4 which
does not include the mixture language. 65 The defendant claimed that
Congress only intended for the pure substance to be used as the weight for
sentencing purposes.
66
The court cited to several cases that had addressed, and subsequently
dispelled, that argument. 167 In so doing, the court stated that there was no
statutory rule of construction that would exact that reading of the statute.
Therefore, Congress meant to use the same method for computing the
weights of pharmaceutical drugs and the "street drugs" listed in 42 U.S.C. §
§ 841(b)(1)(A), (B). 68 Thus, the court upheld Young's conviction.1 69
Judge Bright, however, disagreed. He opined that Young's sentence
should have been calculated according to the pure weight of the
hydromorphone, rather than the gross weight of the Dilaudid.' 7 ' He states
that in "street weight" cases, such as cocaine and heroin, the weight, dose,
and purity are in the control of the defendant. However, "in
pharmaceutical drug cases, the pharmaceutical manufacturer controls the
weight and quantity of the drug."'7 3 Therefore, the legislative intent to
prevent drugs from being diluted and distributed to more people than non-
diluted drugs is without merit.1 4 The judge summed up his argument asfollows:
statutes, including the trafficking statute, but hydromorphone is not listed in SCHEDULE IlI.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 893.03, .135 (1997).
161. Young, 992 F.2d at 208; see also 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (1994).
162. Young, 992 F.2d at 208.
163. Id. at 209.
164. Id. See also § 841(b)(1)(C).
165. Young, 992 F.2d at 209.
166. Id. at209-10.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 211.
170. Young, 992 F.2d at 211 (Bright, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Bright, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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In my view, a defendant should be held responsible for the weight
of inert materials in substances containing a proscribed controlled
drug only to the extent he or she in some way has control over its
content. Here, Young clearly had no control over the weight or
proportion of inert material contained in the Dilaudid tablets, and,
thus, his sentence should be calculated according to the pure
weight of the controlled substance hydromorphone.
1
C. Applicability to Baxley and Holland
After examining the other jurisdictions, a question now remains as to
how these apply to the Baxley and Holland cases. First, one of the big
concerns of the Supreme Court of Florida in Yu was burdening the State to
"make gradations and differentiations" between the drugs with the
"precision of a computer."' 176 However, this was referring to street drugs
such as cocaine, LSD, etc., which all have differing degrees of fillers or
cutting agents. As stated earlier, Vicodin pills all have the same amount of
hydrocodone in them.177 Further, it is also easy to distinguish those pills
from each other since each pill is marked with its dosage.178 Following the
same analysis, the worry of disparate sentencing should also be quelled.
Since Vicodin pills all use the same "carrier medium" or filler-
acetaminophen-there is no fear that a sentence could be based on the
weight of different fillers with the same amount of pure hydrocodone.
Next, looking at the ingestible approach adopted by the court in
Rolande-Gabriel,179  acetaminophen could be labeled as such.
Acetaminophen is a "usable" substance, taken by most of us at some time or
another in the form of Tylenol. Therefore, this approach would most likely
call for aggregating the amount of the entire Vicodin pill as opposed to just
weighing the hydrocodone.
180
Further, in following the majority opinion in the Young case, the total
amount of the Vicodin pill would be calculated, since hydrocodone and
hydromorphone are so similar. 18 However, if courts were to follow Judge
Bright's dissenting opinion,182 the total weight should not be used for
175. Young, 992 F.2d at 212.
176. State v. Yu, 400 So. 2d 762, 764 (Fla. 1981).
177. See supra note 1.
178. Id.
179. 938 F.2d 1231 (llth Cir. 1991).
180. Id. at 1232.
181. See Young, 992 F.2d at 209.
182. Seeid.
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sentencing purposes because the defendant does not have control over how
much hydrocodone is contained in each Vicodin pill.
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER SENTENCING
A. Finding a Middle Road
One suggestion to clear up the ambiguity may actually be very simple:
use only the pure hydrocodone to determine whether it falls under the
trafficking statute. This seems logical because the statute refers to
hydrocodone, not Vicodin. It does not say that possession of four grams of
Vicodin should be known as trafficking in controlled substances. Therefore,
the amount of hydrocodone in the substance would be the determining
factor. Though the statute does say hydrocodone or a substance containing
hydrocodone,18 3 the legislature surely could not have meant to sentence
someone as a first-degree felon for ten pills of Vicodin.
This approach would also settle the dispute in Holland because it would
allow the amount of the pure hydrocodone to be aggregated, regardless of
the amount per dosage unit. Therefore, people with 1000 pills would not
escape the trafficking statute. Using this interpretation, it would take
184
approximately 533 pills to equal four grams. Therefore, it would be more
difficult to charge someone with trafficking in hydrocodone than it would be
under the Baxley decision, but, at least, it could be accomplished.
Furthermore, the Florida Legislature has mandated that penal statutes
must be strictly construed in favor of defendants.18 5  Section 775.021(1) of
the Florida Statutes mandates that "[t]he provisions of this code and
offenses defined by other statutes shall be strictly construed; when the
language is susceptible of differing constructions, it shall be construed most
favorably to the accused." 186 This statute is most definitely capable of
differing constructions, as evidenced by two Florida District Courts of
Appeal giving two entirely different interpretations.18 7 Therefore, under this
rule of construction, the statute should be interpreted in favor of the
defendant. This would mean that the Holland case would prevail, since it
183. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
184. Calculations are done as follows: 4000 (amount of milligrams in four grams)
divided by 7.5 (amount of milligrams of pure hydrocodone in Vicodin) = 533.
185. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1997). See also Thompson v. State, 695 So. 2d 691
(Fla. 1997); Trotter v. State, 576 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1990).
186. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1).
187. Compare State v. Holland, 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997) with
State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
1998]
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would classify hydrocodone as a SCHEDULE III drug, making the offense a
third-degree felony, as opposed to Baxley, which would make possession of
ten pills of Vicodin a first-degree felony. 18
B. A Proposal by Thomas J. Meier
In his article, entitled A Proposal to Resolve the Interpretations of
"Mixture or Substance" Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,189
Thomas J. Meier proposes a method for interpreting "mixture or substance"
considering the inconsistencies created by the Chapman case.19° Under his
design, the weight of the pure drug should be added together with the weight
of any non-drug substance only if all of the following elements are met: 191
(1) [t]he substance cannot be easily distinguished or separated
from the pure drug;
(2) the substance is commonly ingested with the pure drug by
street market level consumers; and
(3) the substance dilutes the pure drug in order to increase the
total quantity of the drug available for distribution at the
street market level.'
92
As Meier suggests, the first element is taken from the Chapman
decision and does not include "the weights of containers and other
packaging materials which are clearly not 'mixed or otherwise combined
with the pure drug. '" 93 This would exclude materials such as glass vials.'
94
The second element excludes any materials that are not ingestible,195 such as
suitcases.196 The third element diverges from the Chapman decision. Meier
suggests that "[i]t distinguishes between cutting agents that dilute the pure
drug in order to increase the amount of the drug available to the consumer,
188. Holland, 689 So. 2d at 1268. See also State v. Baxley, 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
189. Meier, supra note 140, at 403.
190. Id. at403.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 403-04.
193. Meier, supra note 140, at 404 (citing Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453
(1991)).
194. Meier, supra note 140, at 404.
195. Id.
196. See United States v. Mahecha-Onofre, 936 F.2d 623 (1st Cir. 1991).
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and carrier mediums that simply facilitate distribution of the pure drug."' 97
Thus, blotter paper would not be weighed because adding more does not
further dilute the drug.198 There will still be one dose of LSD regardless of
how much blotter paper is added.199
Applying this test to hydrocodone or Vicodin might be a little more
difficult. The first element may not exclude Vicodin because hydrocodone
and acetaminophen are mixed together and not easy to physically separate.
However, there is a prescribed amount of hydrocodone in every Vicodin
tablet. Therefore, in that respect, it would be easy to separate the amount of
hydrocodone from the acetaminophen, even if not physically.
Vicodin would meet the second element, however, because the entire
pill is obviously ingestible and is normally ingested by the street market
consumer. However, there is some question as to the term "street market
level consumers," which calls into question the third element as well.
Hydrocodone is not a drug similar to cocaine or LSD. It is typically not
manufactured illegally, only sold or possessed illegally.? ° Therefore, the
substance is not meant to dilute the drug in order to increase the quantity of
distribution, but is used as part of the entire drug. Acetaminophen is a
painkiller similar to hydrocodone, just not as potent, and not illegal.
Further, it would be practically impossible to dilute the hydrocodone any
more unless you were a pharmaceutical manufacturer, seeing as it is mixed
together chemically. Therefore, Vicodin would most likely fail the third
prong of the test. Since the test is conjunctive, the amount of acetaminophen
cannot be calculated into the total weight under this test.
VI. CONCLUSION
Overall it appears that the prior Florida cases offer little insight into
what to do about the Baxley and Holland situation. The federal cases may
present some guidance, but do not have a great effect since the federal laws
and sentencing structure are set up differently than those of Florida. It
comes down to the fact that section 893.135(1)(c)(1), 2°1 read with section
893.03 of the Florida Statutes,2°2 is susceptible to differing meanings. This
197. Meier, supra note 140, at 405.
198. Id. at 405-06.
199. Id.
200. It is only illegal to possess Vicodin without a prescription, or with a prescription
given under false circumstances.
201. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(l)(c)(1) (1997).
202. Id. § 893.03.
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being the case, the statute has to be read, for now at least, in favor of the
accused. 2°3 This commands following the Holland decision over the Baxley
decision.
The ultimate solution would be for the Florida Legislature to revise
these statutes so as to clarify its intent. With such a split in the Florida
District Courts of Appeal, the alternative is for the Supreme Court of Florida
take a position and answer these questions. Until then, defendants in the
first district will be leaving the courtroom as third-degree felons and
defendants charged with the same crime will leave the Fifth District
classified as first-degree felons.
VII. ADDENDUM
On September 23, 1998, the Fourth District Court of Appeal of Florida
aligned itself with State v. Baxley,204 a Fifth District Court of Appeal
decision, by allowing aggregation of the total weight of a substance
containing hydrocodone, in State v. Hayes.20 5 In Hayes, the defendant called
in a fake prescription of Lorcet2 6 to a pharmacy, under the guise of being
the employee of a doctor.207 The drug store was not able to verify the• - • 208
prescription and thus called the police. When Hayes went to pick up the
prescription, the police were waiting. 209 They arrested her and recovered
forty tablets of the drug Lorcet. 210 Hayes was charged under the trafficking
211
statute , since the aggregate weight of the tablets was more than twenty-
eight grams.212  The trial court dismissed the case, based on State v.
Holland.
213
214The Fourth District Court of Appeal disagreed. In reaching itsdecision, the court looked to some of the legislative history of section
203. FLA. STAT. § 775.021(1) (1997).
204. 684 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1996). See supra notes 19-24 for a
discussion of the Baxley case.
205. 23 Fla. L. Weekly D2184 (4th Dist. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1998).
206. Lorcet is a painkiller similar to Vicodin. See supra note 1. Its make-up is mostly
acetaminophen with a small amount of hydrocodone. Id.
207. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. FLA. STAT. § 893.135(1)(c)(1) (1997).
212. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
213. 689 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997). See supra notes 33-38 for a
discussion of the Holland case.
214. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
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893.135(1)(c)(1) of the Florida Statutes.215 The court noted that section
893.135(1)(c)(1) of the Florida Statutes was amended in 1995 to include
hydrocodone within the ambit of the trafficking statute. 6  In its
interpretation of the legislative history, the court opined that this amendment
was due to the increasing amount of defendants who had been avoiding
conviction for trafficking because of the absence of the substance in the
statute. 7 Therefore, the court concluded, Hayes was exactly the kind of
person that the legislature was trying to allow the state to prosecute when it
broadened the statute.1 8
The court recognized, however, that the statute is still not clear as to
which quantities fall under the SCHEDULE II classification and which are
merely SCHEDULE III substances, keeping them from the reach of the
trafficking statute.2 9 Due to the absence of clear authority in Florida, the
court looked to the federal cases in search of an answer to this question, and
was the first Florida Court to do so.2a0 The court examined Chapman v.
United States221 and United States v. Rolande-Gabriel
2 2 in its opinion.223
Using the analysis from these two opinions, the court opined that, with
respect to the Lorcet tablets in the instant case, "[t]he hydrocodone has been
mixed, or commingled, with the acetaminophen, and the two are ingested
together. The acetaminophen facilitates the use, marketing, and access of the
hydrocodone." 224 Based on this analysis, along with the legislative intent
and the Supreme Court's "mixture" definition, this court concluded that
the "aggregate weight of the tablets seized from Hayes, and not the amount
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
220. Id.
221. 500 U.S. 453 (1991).
222. 938 F.2d 1231 (11th Cir. 1991).
223. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
224. Id.
225. The United States Supreme Court stated in Chapman that "mixture" is defined as:
"matter consisting of two or more components that do not bear a fixed proportion to one
another and that however thoroughly commingled are regarded as retaining a separate
existence." Chapman, 500 U.S. at 461 (citing WEBSTER'S TIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DIcTrONARY 1449 (1986)). The Chapman Court also looked to another dictionary for a
definition: "A 'mixture' may also consist of two substances blended together so that the
particles of one are diffused among the particles of the other." Id. at 461 (citing 9 OXFoRD
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 921 (2d ed. 1989)).
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of hydrocodone per dosage unit, is the determinative weight for prosecution
under section 893.135(1)(c)(1) for trafficking in a SCHEDULE II drug."22
6
Though this court at least attempted to look to other sources for its
information, this analysis fails for the same reasons that the case with which
it aligned itself did; it is too over-inclusive. The defendant in this case is
now a first-degree felon for the possession of forty pills. Granted,
punishment for forty pills is more conceivable than being sentenced as a
first-degree felon for possession of ten pills. Yet, this decision would
uphold a prosecution for as little as ten pills. So, essentially, this decision
just serves to render more confusion across the state. Until either the
Supreme Court of Florida or the Florida Legislature takes notice of this
discord, the quandary survives.
Heather A. Perry
226. Hayes, 23 Fla. L. Weekly at D2185.
[Vol. 23:523
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 12
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss1/12
Jerry Berman
Executive Director - Center for Democracy and Technology
Jerry Berman is the Executive Director of the Center for Democracy and
Technology (CDT) in Washington, D.C. CDT is an independent, non-profit
public interest policy organization whose mission is to develop and implement
public policies to protect and advance individual liberty and democratic values
on the Internet and in new digital media. The Center achieves its goals through
policy development, public education, and coalition building. CDT activities
are funded by foundations and a broad cross-section of communications firms,
computer firms, and users of the Internet.
Last year, Mr. Berman and CDT coordinated the Citizens Internet
Empowerment Coalition (CIEC) - 47 online publishers, communications
firms, and public interest groups - that challenged the Communications
Decency Act. CIEC attorneys argued this landmark First Amendment case
in the Supreme Court (Reno v. ACLU).
Mr. Berman and CDT coordinate the Digital Privacy and Security Working
Group (DPSWG), comprised of over fifty communications firms,
associations, and civil liberties groups addressing communications privacy
policy issues. The group works to develop policies favoring strong
encryption tools and laws designed to protect privacy and commerce on the
Internet.
Mr. Berman has led coalitions to draft and enact such legislation as the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978; the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986; the Computer Security Act of 1987;
the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988; and the transactional information
privacy protections in the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act of 1994. Mr. Berman also helped to draft and enact the Electronic
Freedom of Information Amendments of 1996.
Mr. Berman writes in both scholarly and popular journals on privacy, free
speech, and information access issues. Most recently, he has co-authored
two articles with Daniel Weitzner of CDT, "Technology and Democracy" in
Social Research (Fall 1997) and "Abundance and User Control: Renewing
the Democratic Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactice
Media," in the Yale Law Journal (May 1995).
Mr. Berman received his B.A., M.A., and LL.B. at the University of
California, Berkeley.
25
Perry: Drug Trafficking Sentencing in Florida: Can Seven Pills Turn a De
Published by NSUWorks, 1998
